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CALCULATING PROJECTED DISPOSABLE
INCOME OF AN ABOVE-MEDIAN CHAPTER

13 DEBTOR
Matthew Showel*

I. INTRODUCTION

T

he American consumer is in a historically dire situation. Consumer
debt relative to income is at an all-time high' while the job market
is experiencing record layoffs.' This will undoubtedly lead to a deluge
of consumer bankruptcy filings in the coming years.
In 2005, at the urging of unsecured lenders lead by the credit
card industry, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ["BAPCA"].3 Before BAPCPA,
consumers could choose whether to file for relief under Chapter 7 or
Chapter 13.' Chapter 7 allows the consumer to discharge a majority of
his unsecured debt, such as credit card debt.5 The Chapter 7 debtor
may also have to sell some assets such as his home.6 In Chapter 13, the
debtor pays off some of his unsecured debt under a payment plan.7
Prior to BAPCPA, the vast majority of consumer bankruptcy
cases were filed under Chapter 7.8 In 2005, Chapter 7 cases constituted
more than 1.5 million of approximately 2.0 million total consumer
bankruptcy filings.' In 2004, 1.1 out of 1.5 million consumer
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See Am. Bankr. Inst., Bankruptcy Filing Statistics, www.abiworld.org/statistics (scroll
down to "Consumer debt is consistent with bankruptcy filings", click on image) (last visited Feb.
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H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. i,at 575.
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bankruptcy filings were under Chapter 7." In 2003, Chapter 7 cases
comprised more than 70% of consumer bankruptcy filings.1' In 1996,
when consumer bankruptcy filings first topped one million, more than
700,000 of the filings came under Chapter 7.12 The consumer preference
for Chapter 7 indicates that, prior to BAPCPA, consumers chose to
discharge their unsecured debt over keeping some of their assets under
a Chapter 13 plan. 3
The consumer preference for Chapter 7 led politicians, scholars,
and credit card companies to believe consumers were abusing Chapter
7 to walk away from credit card debts they had accumulated.' 4 Scholars
and credit card companies speculated that consumers were discharging
their unsecured debt even though, in many cases, they could pay a
significant portion under a Chapter 13 repayment plan.'
The central feature of BAPCPA is a "means test."' 6 Under the
means test, if a Chapter 7 filer's income is above a certain amount, the
debtor is presumed to be abusing the system. 7 Unless the debtor can
rebut this presumption by documenting an actual need for Chapter 7,
the debtor must file under Chapter 13.18 By forcing some debtors into
Chapter 13, Congress hoped to force debtors to take responsibility for
their debts and pay off as possible."
The means test comes into play a second time for many Chapter
13 debtors. In order for the debtor to receive Chapter 13 relief, the court
must approve the debtor's payment plan.2" If the bankruptcy trustee or
a creditor' objects to the plan, generally the court may only approve the
plan if all of the debtor's projected disposable income is committed to
repay creditors." Prior to BAPCPA bankruptcy courts had wide
discretion over what amount of a debtor's income was disposable.
Post BAPCPA, a debtor's projected disposable income is to be
determined with reference to the means test.23 BAPCPA defines
disposable income using the means test.24 Disposable income is
essentially the debtor's income from all sources for the six months prior
1OPrice, supra note

4.

1 Id.
12 Id.

Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 143.
15 Id.
16 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. i,at 2 (2005).
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17

Id.
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to the date of filing, less reasonably necessary expenses." If the debtor's
income is above the median for his home state, the debtor's reasonably
necessary expenses are determined with reference to standards set out
in the means test.2 6 The means test's use of historical income and
hypothetical standards often creates an inaccurate picture of the
debtor's disposable income. Nonetheless, §1325(b) makes clear that
bankruptcy courts are to determine debtor's projected disposable
27
income in reference to the means test.
Currently, there is a split among the circuit courts as to
whether "projected disposable income" is calculated by mechanical
application of the definition of disposable income, or whether courts
may deviate from the means test calculation in order to reflect the
debtor's actual ability to pay. The Ninth Circuit, along with several
bankruptcy courts, has held that BAPCPA's new definition of
disposable income requires a "mechanical approach" to calculation of a
debtor's projected disposable income whereby "disposable income" and
"projected disposable income" are synonymous, 28 regardless of whether
that figure accurately represents a debtor's ability to adhere to a
payment plan. Conversely, the majority approach is the "forwardlooking approach. '29 Under the forward-looking approach, the debtor's
disposable income, as defined by the means test, is presumed to be the
debtor's projected disposable income. 3' However, under the forwardlooking approach, the court may deviate from that figure if it does not
accurately reflect the debtor's ability to make payments. The Eighth
and Tenth Circuits have adopted the forward-looking approach. 1
This paper addresses the ongoing circuit split as to the proper
way to determine "projected disposable income" of an above-median
Chapter 13 debtor. This paper will demonstrate that the statutory
language supports the forward-looking approach to the extent it
supports either approach. Additionally, this paper will demonstrate
that the nine years of legislative history indicate that Congressional
intent supports the forward-looking approach. This paper will also
demonstrate that the mechanical approach leads to absurd results and
thus common sense supports the forward-looking approach. Finally,
this paper will demonstrate that the economic realities of bankruptcy
2s Id.
26 Id.

27 Id.
28 See e.g. In re Kagenveama, 541 F. 3 d 868 ( 9 th Cir. 2008); In re Alexander, 344 B.R. 742
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2oo6); In re Austin, 372 B.R. 668 (Bankr. D.Vt. 2007); In re Kolb, 366 B.R. 802
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007); In re Hanks, 362 B.R. 494 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007); In re Miller, 361 B.R.
224 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2007); In re Tranmer, 355 B.R. 234 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2oo6); and In re Barr,
341 B.R. 18i, 185 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2oo6).
29 In re Lanning, 545 F. 3 d 1269, 1270 (ioth Cir. 2oo8).
32 Id. at 1270.
'

Id.; In re Frederickson,545 F.3d 652 (8th Cir. 2o08).
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support the forward-looking approach.

II. BACKGROUND
In April 2005, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"), the
culmination of several years of efforts to reform the Bankruptcy Code
("Code").3 2 BAPCPA is ostensibly intended to avoid abuse of the
bankruptcy laws by debtors.33 Since its initial proposal in 1996, the
bankruptcy reforms that constitute BAPCPA have spawned a great
deal of controversy among legal scholars and social commentators.
Among those that have taken issue with the law are labor unions, the
ACLU, and various consumer advocates. 4
"Means testing" is the central feature of the Bill's consumer
bankruptcy reforms. 5 The means testing mechanism was adopted to
ensure that debtors pay the maximum amount they can afford. 6 Prior
to BAPCPA, the law did not require the court to examine a debtor's
ability to repay hisdebts." Consequently, some Chapter 7 debtors who
could have paid a portion of their unsecured debts were able to walk
away from those obligations. 8 Moreover, debtors filing for Chapter 7
were presumed to need relief.39 Under the means test, a consumer
debtor's reasonably necessary expenses are weighed against his income
to determine monthly disposable income.4" Generally, consumer debtors
having more than a certain threshold amount41 of disposable monthly
income are barred from Chapter 7 protection and are instead forced
into Chapter 13.42 The hope is that in a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13
situation, the consumer will be able to pay some of his debts over
time.43 In exchange, the consumer is discharged of obligations that
would remain under Chapter 7.44 Chapter 7 liquidation discharges the
" H.R. REP. NO. 109-31,
3 Price, supra note 4, at
31 H.R. REP. No. 109-31,
35 H.R. REP. No. 109-31,
36

pt. i,at 2 (2005).
143.

pt. i, at 541 (2005).
pt. i,at 2 (2oo5).

Id.

31 S. Hrg. 105-89 at 7. Increase in Personal Bankruptcy and the Crisis in Consumer Credit,
hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Senate
Judiciary Committee (April ii, 1997). Reprinted in William H. Manz, Bankruptcy Reform: The
Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Preventionand Consumer ProtectionAct of 2005, vol.
i8, document 233.
38 Id.
" H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. I,at49.
40 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 2o, at

§

13:43.

4" Roughly $167.00 in 2007.
42 Price, supra note 4, at 136-37
41 Id. at 138.
44 Robert J. Bein, Subjectivity, Good Faith, and the Expanded Chapter r3 Discharge, 70 MO.
L. REV. 655,656 (Summer 2005).

2009]

CalculatingIncome of Chapter 13 Debtor

majority of the debtor's unsecured obligations, leaving little or nothing
for unsecured creditors such as credit card companies.4 5 However, the
debtor also has to sell certain assets in which the debtor has equity.46
Conversely, in Chapter 13, the debtor forms a plan to pay some or all of
his unsecured debt over time. The means test also comes into play in
determining a Chapter 13 debtor's ability to repay creditors under a
payment plan.
A recent Tenth Circuit decision highlights a decisive split in the
courts as to the exact role the means test plays in determining a Chapter
13 debtor's ability to pay creditors.4 8 In In re Lanning, the Tenth
Circuit examined the two opposing methods courts have used to
calculate "projected disposable income" of an above-median Chapter 13
debtor under BAPCPA.49 A majority has adopted the "forward-looking
approach."5 Under this approach, the Chapter 13 debtor's six-month
"disposable income," as it is defined by the Code, is presumed to be the
debtor's projected disposable income unless the debtor can demonstrate
that that figure should not constitute projected disposable income. In
that case, the court may take into account a debtor's special
circumstances in calculating projected disposable income and
confirming a plan."
A minority of courts has adopted the "mechanical approach" to
calculating projected disposable income. 3 Under this approach, the
court interprets "disposable income" and "projected disposable income"
as synonymous. 4 The court uses the statutory definition of disposable
income (there is no statutory definition of projected disposable income)
and projects that number as the amount the debtor will be able to pay
over the term of the plan.5

III. CHAPTER 13 PROCESS
A debtor seeking bankruptcy protection initiates the process by
filing a petition with the courts. 6 At or near the time of filing, he must
present a payment plan, a completed "Schedule I" (Current Income of
45 Price, supra note
46 Id. at 137.
47

4, at 136-37.

Id.

41 In re Lanning, 545 F. d at 1270.
3
49 Id.
so Id.
s' Id.
52

Id.

s$ See Manny v. Kagenveama, 541 F. 3 d 868 (9th Cir. 2oo8).
14 In re Lanning, 545 F.3d at 1270.
55Id.
56

11 U.S.C. § 301 (2005).
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Individual Debtor), "Schedule J' (Current Expenditures of Individual
Debtor) and "Form B22C" (Statement of Current Monthly Income and
Disposable Income Calculation). 7 In the payment plan, the debtor
proposes a schedule under which she will use her projected disposable
income to repay some or all of her debts over a period of three to five
years. 8 Form B22C reqhires the debtor to calculate "current monthly
income" as an average of all income received in the six calendar months
prior to the month the bankruptcy petition is filed. 9
The payment plan is the central feature of Chapter 13
bankruptcy.6" Creditors may oppose the debtor's proposed plan.6 §1325
provides the requirements that a plan must meet for confirmation.62
Among these requirements are the following: the plan must be proposed
in good faith;6 3 the plan must be feasible (i.e. a plan must be such that
the debtor can reasonably be expected to comply);6 4 and the petition

must be filed in good faith.65
Both pre and post-2005, the debtor's ability to pay is generally
calculated by subtracting expenses from income projected over the life
of the plan.66 Prior to BAPCPA, disposable income was defined as
income less "reasonably necessary" expenses.6 In the pre-BAPCPA
cases, courts had a great deal of discretion as to what expenses were
reasonably necessary, and what income was disposable.6" Courts
differed drastically on the degree to which it was appropriate for the
court to scrutinize the debtor's lifestyle in determining what expenses
were reasonably necessary.6 9
BAPCPA contains a new definition of disposable income that
relies on the means test for determining whether abuse exists in a
Chapter 7 case. Disposable income is defined as current monthly
income, as defined in §101(10A), less reasonably necessary expenses.70 If
a debtor's current monthly income is above his state's median income
for a comparable household, his reasonable and necessary expenses are
to be determined in accordance with §707's means test.7' Under the
means test, and corresponding form B22C, the debtor's expenses are
I I U.S.C. § 1322 (West 2005).
58 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 20, at § 13:43.

19 In re Lanning, 545 F. 3 d at 1271.
60 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 20, at § 13:18.
61 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (West 2005).
62

Id.

6' Id. at (a)(3).
Id. at (a)(6).
65 Id. at (a)(7).
66

BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, supra note 20, at § 13:43.

67 Id.
' Id.
69 Id.

7' 11 U.S.C. § 1 3 25(b)(2) (2005).
" Id. at (b)(3 ).
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determined according to IRS national and local tables of living
expenses.72 In the case of an above-median income debtor, BAPCPA
limits the bankruptcy court's discretion as to what expenses are
permissible in the calculation of disposable income.73 Conversely, if a
debtor's income is lower than the state median, the debtor's actual
expenses and judicial discretion will determine the debtor's disposable
income.74 Thus, for below-median Chapter 13 debtors, pre and post75
2005 calculations of disposable income are largely the same.
If the plan meets all the requirements of §1325(a), the debtor
must still overcome §1325(b).76 This section provides that if the trustee
or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to a plan, the court
may not confirm the plan unless either (1) the value to be paid out in
satisfaction of such claim is not less than the amount of the claim; or (2)
the plan provides that all the debtor's "projected disposable income"
will be paid out under the plan. (emphasis added). Thus some holders
of unsecured claims, such as credit card companies, will force the
debtor to pledge all of his "projected disposable income" in a Chapter
13 plan. Not surprisingly, this happens frequently.7 8 However, courts
disagree on how to calculate "projected disposable income."

IV. THE SPLIT
As noted, under §1325(b)(1)(B) of BAPCPA, the court may
approve a Chapter 13 plan over objection only if, "as of the effective
date of the plan," the plan "provides that all of the debtor's projected
disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment
period... will be applied to make payments to creditors under the
plan."79 (emphasis added). Courts are split as to how to define
"projected disposable income." § 1325(b)(2) defines "disposable income"
for an above-median debtor" as "current monthly income," (CMI). CMI
is defined in §101(10A)(A)(i) as the average of the debtor's monthly
income from all sources for the six-month period ending in the month
prior to filing.81 Thus, "disposable income" is the average of the debtor's
monthly income for the six months prior to the month of filing his
72 BANKRUPTcY LAW MANUAL, supra note 20, at § 13:43.

73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
71 BANKRUPTcY LAW MANUAL, supra note 2o,at § 73:437' ii U.S.C. § 13 25(b)(i)(B) (2005).
' Henceforth, any debtor referred to in this paper is an above-median debtor unless
otherwise specified.
" ii U.S.C. § ioI(ioA))(A)(i) (2007).
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bankruptcy petition.
The split turns on whether projected disposable income is
calculated by mechanical application of the definitions of disposable
income and current monthly income, or whether courts may adjust the
disposable income calculated on Form B22C according to the debtor's
actual ability to make plan payments. Several courts have held that
BAPCPA's new definitions of disposable income and CMI require a
"mechanical approach" to calculation of a debtor's projected disposable
income whereby "disposable income" and "projected disposable
income" are synonymous. 2 The court applies the debtor's disposable
income as calculated on B22C to the applicable commitment period,
regardless of whether that figure accurately represents a debtor's ability
to make payments over the commitment period. Conversely, the
majority approach is the "forward-looking approach." 3 Under the
forward-looking approach, the debtor's "disposable income" (as defined
by §1325 and §101(10A)) is presumed to be the debtor's projected
disposable income. 4 However, under the forward-looking approach,
the debtor can then rebut that calculation of projected disposable
income by showing that the calculation does not accurately reflect the
debtor's ability to make payments. Hence, in determining the amount a
debtor can pay over the life of the plan, the courts will account for any
drastic change in income prior to filing.

V. THE "FORWARD-LOOKING APPROACH"
In In re Lanning, an issue of first impression, the Tenth Circuit
adopted the forward-looking approach. The court affirmed decisions of
both the bankruptcy and Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Court
(hereafter bankruptcy appellate courts will be referred to as "BAP")."
The debtor was a single woman who filed Chapter 13 in October, 2006
to address $36,793.36 in unsecured debt. 6 She had income of $43,147 in
2004, and $56,516 in 2005.87 During the six-month period before filing
her petition, the debtor accepted a buyout from her employer, Payless
Shoes. 8 The buyout increased her monthly gross income to $11,990.03
in April 2006, and $15,356.42 in May, 2006.89
The Debtor's Schedule I listed a monthly net income of $1,922
See supra note 28 for a list of cases employing the mechanical approach.
SIn re Lanning, 545 F.3d at 1270.
g4 Id.
82

85 Id.

Id.
Id.
s Id. at 1278.
89 In re Lanning, 545 F.3d at
6

87

127I.
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($23,604 annually), reflecting income from a job she acquired after
leaving Payless." She filed a Schedule J showing actual monthly
expenses of $1,772.97."' Thus, she had excess income of $149.03.92 The
debtor's form B22C current monthly income was $5,343.70 and
included her buyout from Payless. 3 Annualized, her current monthly
income was higher than the $36,631.00 median income for a family of
one in Kansas.94 Thus, she was required to complete B22C, calculating
deductions and exceptions according to IRS standards. 5 Per her B22C,
the debtor's monthly expenses totaled $4,228.71.96 Under §1325(b)(2),
this left her a monthly disposable income" of $1,114.98.
The debtor's Schedule J showed excess monthly income of
$149.00 and the debtor proposed a plan of $144.00 per month for thirtysix months. 8 In total, the debtor's proposed plan called for payment of
$5,184 in satisfaction of $36,793.36 of unsecured debt.9
The bankruptcy trustee objected to the plan, arguing that
§1325(b)(1)(B) required a rigid formula for determining projected
disposable income based on the debtor's historical monthly income as
calculated on Form B22C.' ° The trustee proposed she pay $756 over
sixty months) ° r The trustee's proposed plan was notable for two
reasons. First, it was less than the supposedly inflexible B22C formula
would prescribe (if the B22C formula is inflexible she should have to
pay her monthly disposable income of $1,114.98 per month). Second,
and puzzling to say the least, the trustee acknowledged that she did not
°2
have the income to support the trustee's plan.
The bankruptcy court employed the forward-looking approach,
holding that the monthly disposable income reflected on form B22C
constituted projected disposable income under §1325(b)(1)(B),
contingent on a showing that the Form B22C calculations accurately
reflected the debtor's ability to make plan payments."°3 If the debtor
experiences change in financial circumstances, such that the form B22C
amounts are not an accurate reflection of the debtor's ability to pay, the
court will take other considerations into account.' °
90Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.

93 Id.
9 Id.
95In re Lanning, 545 F.3d at 1271.
96

Id.

97Id.
98Id.
99 Id.
o In re Lanning, 545 F.3d at 127 .

Id. at 1272.
Io'
1o2 Id.
103 Id. at 1273.

104 Id.
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VI.THE "MECHANICAL APPROACH"

The court in In re Kagenveama adopted the "mechanical
approach.' In 2005, the debtor filed for Chapter 13 protection.0 6
Along with her petition, she filed the required Schedules I and J and
Form B22C. °7 Her Schedule I income totaled $4,096.26, while Schedule
J expenses totaled $2,572.37, leaving $1,523.89 in disposable income.0 8
The debtor's Form B22C listed average monthly income of $6,168.2 L' 0
Because she was an above-median debtor, she had to calculate her
expenses according to the §707(b)(2) means test."0 After the appropriate
expenses were deducted, her Form B22C listed disposable income as a
negative number: -$4.04. The debtor proposed a plan under which she
would pay $1,000.00 per month over three years."' In what can be
accurately described as a nonsensical result, the court held that the
mechanical approach was the correct approach and the debtor's
"projected disposable income" was negative, despite the fact that the
debtor claimed she had disposable income and was willing to pay her
creditors." 2

VII. ANALYSIS
A. "Plain"Text of the Statute
Courts adopting the mechanical approach, as well as those
adopting the forward-looking approach, rely heavily on the supposedlyplain language of the BAPCPA amendments. The court in Lanning
noted that the words "projected" and "to be received" would be
superfluous if a debtor's historical disposable income was the only
consideration." 3 The court also emphasized Schedule I's instruction
that the debtor provide an "'estimate of average or projected monthly
income at the time the case is filed,"' along with "'any increase or
decrease in income reasonably anticipated to occur within the year
following the filing of [Schedule I].' 4 (emphasis added). This is

106

In re Kagenveama, 541 F. 3 d at 868.
Id. at 871.

107

Id.

os

log Id.
109 Id.
1o Id.
In re Kagenveama, 541 F. 3 d at 871.
I Id. at 871-72.
113 Inre Lanning, 545 F.3d at 1273.
114 Id.
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significant because opponents of the forward-looking approach argue
15
that projected has no definition outside of B22C disposable income.
However, within the body of documents traditionally used to determine
the debtor's ability to pay, the term projected is linked to the term
"estimate." As will be discussed in more detail later, the Schedule I
estimate of projected income was traditionally a product of the
bankruptcy court's discretion. Nothing in BAPCPA purports to
eliminate that discretion." 6 At the very least, the term "estimate"
implies an educated guess at what the debtor's disposable income will
be over the life of the plan. That educated guess is explicitly
conditioned on "any increase or decrease in income reasonably
anticipated to occur." The important thing is that "projected" is not a
term that only exists in relation to B22C disposable income. It has a
long-standing association in Chapter 13 procedure with the notion of
estimating what the debtor's ability to pay actually will be over the life
of the plan. There is no indication in the statute that that has changed.
In affirming the bankruptcy court's decision, the BAP noted
that BAPCPA changed the definition of disposable income, but did not
change projected disposable income, which had an accepted meaning
prior to BAPCPA." 7 Courts understood projected disposable income to
mean Schedule I income less Schedule J expenses, subject to
adjustment at the court's discretion if that calculation did not fairly
reflect the debtor's ability to pay." 8
Most significantly, the BAP found that "although the BAPCPA
amendments 'specify the formula by which to determine a debtor's
median standing, as well as the monthly disposable income as of the
date of the petition, they give us no reason to believe that Congress
intended to eliminate the bankruptcy court's discretion...,""'" The
court suggested that that the BAPCPA gave no reason, beyond the
mere existence of the Form B22C means test, that Congress intended to
entirely strip the court of its traditional discretion.12 The court took the
stance that B22C created a rebuttable presumption as to the debtor's
2
disposable income over the life of the plan.1 '
The Tenth Circuit went on to point out that the relevant
language of §1325(b)(1)(B) is substantially the same as it was prior to
BAPCPA, i.e. that all projected disposable income received by the
debtor in the payment period will be applied to satisfy creditors. 122 In
"s

16

In re Kagenveama, 541 F. 3 d at 872-73.

Id. at 1274.

117 Id.
118 Id.

.. In re Lanning,545 F.3d at 1274.
120 Id.
121 Id.

.. Id. at 1275.
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relying on the old definition of "projected disposable income," Congress
must not have wanted to completely alter the practices associated with
the concept. More likely, Congress intended B22C disposable income as
a starting point or measuring stick to settle discrepancies in the courts
as to what sources of income and expenses are appropriate for
calculating projected disposable income." 3 In leaving the language
surrounding projected disposable income as it was pre-BAPCPA,
Congress left courts a significant portion of their traditional discretion
to estimate the debtor's ability to pay; but anchored that discretion to
the means test in B22C.
The Lanning court went on to demonstrate that "projected" is a
nexus between "disposable income" and "to be received in the
applicable period.' 1 24 Thus "projected disposable income" is that much
disposable income (as it is defined in §1325(b)(2) and §101(10A)) as will
be available to the debtor during the plan period. The debtor commits
all "disposable income" that is "projected. . .to be received in the
applicable commitment period.'1 5 An interpretation that suggests that
projected disposable income is synonymous with disposable income
ignores the language "projected... to be received in the applicable plan
period.' 2' Additionally, it ignores the relevance of Schedules I and J in.
the Chapter 13 process. Surely, after a decade of negotiating revision to
the bankruptcy laws, Congress was familiar with past practice of the
courts. By leaving Schedules I and J unchanged, one can assume
Congress was comfortable with the traditional role those forms play,
i.e., informing the court's decision as to what type of plan a debtor can
actually pay.
In coming to the opposite conclusion, the Kagenveama court
also relied heavily on the statutory language. Ironically, both parties in
the case claimed that a reading of the "plain text" of the statute
supported their interpretation.' 27 The Ninth Circuit held that the
mechanical approach was "the most natural reading of the statute" and
adopted the mechanical approach.1 8 Apparently the readings proffered
by the majority of courts are all less natural. The court then simply
projected her means test disposable income over the applicable
commitment period.
The court reasoned "[t]he substitution of any data not covered
'3
See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. i, at 5 (for the proposition that Congress intended the
means test to settle such differences in the court...).
"24 In re Lanning, 545 F-3 d at 1279.
15 Id.

126 Id. at 1278.
"' In re Kagenveama, 541 F. 3 d at 873. This is highly ironic considering that nearly every
court on both sides of the argument states that the "plain" text of the statute supports their
decision.
128 Id.
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by the §1325(b)(2) definition in the "projected disposable income"
calculation would render as surplusage the definition of "disposable
income" found in §1325(b)(2)." 9 This proposition, however, is
objectively false. Use of the § 1325(b)(2) disposable income, as a starting
point, rather than an end point, does not render the definition
surplusage.3 ° To the contrary, it requires the definition. The definition
of disposable income remains essential to the courts' determination of
projected disposable income.
The court went on to say the word "projected" does not provide
a basis for including other data in the calculation "because 'projected'
is simply a modifier of the defined term 'disposable income. '"""' Again,
this is false. The court draws an illusory. distinction between "modify"
and "add data." By the. court's own explanation, "projected" modifies
"disposable income." If it modifies the term, it necessarily adds data.
There is no distinction between modifying a term and adding data to it.
Modify means "to limit the meaning of, especially in grammatical
construction," "change," or "alter."' 32 Thus, the data imported in
"disposable income" is limited or altered by the data imported by the
word "projected." Even the court's use of projected adds something to
disposable income. The Kagenveama court's reading of projected adds
data dictating that disposable income should be multiplied by the
applicable plan length. Not only is this totally unnatural, but it is
unsupported by anything in the statute. Presumably, if Congress
intended such a specific meaning, they could have, over the eight years
and thousands of pages it took to draft the legislation, specified as
much. Moreover, no dictionary defines projected as "multiplied over
the life of the plan."
Conversely, the forward-looking approach does employ a
reading of projected that is natural to the English language and natural
to bankruptcy law. Definitions la and lb in The Merriam-Webster
Dictionarydefine the verb project as "1 a: to devise in the mind, design;
b: to plan, figure, or estimate for the future."'3 3 The forward-looking
approach requires courts to do just that; to devise in the mind, plan,
figure, or estimate what disposable income (as defined in §1325(b)(2))
will be over the life of the plan. Thereby, the court attempts to create a
plan that satisfies the feasibility requirement of §1325(a)(6).
Additionally, the forward-looking reading of projected is consistent
This is important because
with traditional Chapter 13 practice.
although BAPCPA changed the definition of disposable income, it did
129Id.

In re Lanning, 545. F- 3 d at 128o.
In re Kagenveama, 54. F.3d at 873.
132 MERRIAM-WEBSTERDICTIONARY 3I7 (2oo5).
'-i Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com (last visited Mar. 28, 2009).
'~
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not address the term "projected" as it relates to disposable income. 134 As
stated earlier, before BABCPA courts used discretion to estimate a
debtor's future ability to pay. A natural reading of projected, in light of
the fact that BAPCPA took no steps to change, or even address, its
meaning, would assume that it had a meaning similar to its preBAPCPA meaning.'35 This is especially true in light of the fact that
Congress was specifically addressing debtors' ability to make Chapter
13 payments. Had Congress wanted to create such a specific and
counterintuitive definition of projected over the decade they took to
amend the statute, it is safe to assume they would have done so. It is
difficult to think that Congress forgot, or just didn't get to it.
Thus, although BAPCPA severely limited the court's discretion
as to what expenses an above-median debtor could deduct from
disposable income, it did not limit the court's traditional discretion in
estimating what portion of that income would be available to satisfy
creditors over the plan life.

B. Legislative History
Along with Congress' repeated, explicit declarations that they
designed BAPCPA to ensure that debtors pay creditors as much as they
are able, there is additional evidence in the legislative history that
supports the forward-looking approach. House Report 109-31 states
that, in furtherance of its goal of holding debtors accountable for their
debts, BAPCPA is designed to settle disparities among the courts as to
what expenses are reasonably necessary.'3 6 The forward-looking
approach does not leave the definition of "disposable income" in
1225(b)(2) without purpose.
Rather, under the forward-looking
approach, disposable income is an essential reference point. It gives the
bankruptcy courts a set of norms from which to begin their
determination of projected disposable income.137 Thereby, B22C
disposable income settles the differences among courts that Congress
referred to in House Report 109-31.13" House Report 109-31 states that
a factor calling for bankruptcy reform is disagreement within the courts
as to how thoroughly the courts should examine a debtor's lifestyle to
determine whether the debtor has the ability to pay creditors.'3 9 Courts
had nearly-total discretion over whether a debtor could or should repay
"' In re Lanning, 545 F. 3 d at 1274.
135 Id.
i
16 H.R. Rep. No. 109-3 , pt. i at 5 (2005).
15In

re Lanning, 545 F.3d at 128o.

3 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. i, at 5.
19 Id.
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some of his debts.' ° The purpose of BAPCPA is to settle these
discrepancies in favor of courts thoroughly examining what the debtor
can pay and forcing the debtor to pay that amount.' 4' The court's
analysis will begin with B22 disposable income. 4 2 From that starting
point, "projected" allows the court to account for events that will
43
necessarily affect a debtor's ability to pay.1
There is additional evidence within the Means Test indicates
that Congress intended courts to exercise discretion in calculating
income and expenses. Section 1325(b)(3) mandates that a debtor's
reasonably necessary expenses be calculated according to Section
707(b)(2)(A) and (B).'44 In §707(b)(2)(B), Congress explicitly allows a
debtor to rebut the §707(b) presumption of abuse "by demonstrating
special circumstances... to the extent such special circumstances justify
additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for
which there is no reasonable alternative.' 1 45 Such a special
circumstance might include medical bills. 46 The means test used to
create the presumption of abuse in Chapter 7 proceedings is the same
test used to determine disposable income. It seems extremely unlikely
that Congress recognized that debtors filing Chapter 7 may have
special needs requiring the court to deviate from the specific provisions
of the means test, but did not recognize such a need in for Chapter 13
debtors. To the contrary, the interdependence of the two chapters and
their similar use of the means test, suggest that Congress would expect
similar treatment regarding special circumstances. Indeed, in the
"Dissenting Views" section of House Report 109-31, thirteen
Congressmen and women discuss the operation of the means test in
Chapters 7 and 13 interchangeably. 47 The discussion indicates an
understanding among the Congressmen and women that the test
functions the same in either instance. They concede that Section 1325's
application of the IRS expenses in a Chapter 13 case can be rebutted48
upon a showing by the debtor that those expenses are unreasonable.
Thus the BAPCPA does reserve leeway for the judge in a Chapter 13
context if the debtor can demonstrate that the calculations of the means
test are unreasonable.
This Section 707(b)(2)(B) special circumstances allowance
Id.
Id.
141 In re Lanning, 545 F. 3 d at 1282.
143 Id.
14'H.R. REP. No. 109-31, Pt. I, at 49.
145 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (2008). See also H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. i,at 49; BAPCPA
140

141

S.256, Iogth Congress § 102 (2005).
146

117
148

Id.

H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. i at 557-58.
H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1at 558.
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supports the notion that the means test is a reference point from which
the examination of the debtor's financial condition must start. This
method adds consistency to the way in which courts examine a debtors'
financial condition while leaving the courts room to make adjustments
where no reasonable alternative exists. In the instance of someone who
had a job during the six months prior to filing, but no longer has a job,
there is no reasonable alternative but for the court to account for the
change in income. It is patently unreasonable for a court to ignore the
fact that a debtor has lost his job and pretend that a debtor's income is
more than it actually is.
The BAPCPA creates a guide for exactly how deeply a court
should scrutinize a debtor's lifestyle in judging the debtor's ability to
pay. Moreover, as multiple courts have pointed out, the Form B22C
calculation of disposable income will, in most instances, be applied as
projected disposable income.'4 9 Thus, newly-defined "disposable
income" serves a critical role in Chapter 13, despite the fact that it may
not always be an exact measure of projected disposable income that the
debtor will "receive[] in the applicable plan period."
The mechanical approach leads to results that are absurd in
some instances, as in the Kagenveama case, and extremely difficult on
the debtor in other cases. Debtors such as the one in Lanning, discussed
above, would be foreclosed from bankruptcy protection while debtors
who are much better off financially would be able to obtain bankruptcy
relief. 5' For example, suppose an above-median debtor has disposable
income as defined in the means test. That debtor cannot file for
Chapter 7. If that debtor were laid off from the local factory just prior
to filing, his six-month prepetition income would be significantly higher
than his actual ability to pay. Under the mechanical approach, the
debtor must commit his prepetition income (which he no longer earns,
and is unlikely to earn any time soon). Because of the feasibility
requirement of § 1325(a)(6), that debtor cannot confirm a plan under the
mechanical approach." 1
Therefore, he cannot obtain Chapter 13
protection. Thus, under the mechanical approach the responsible but
unfortunate debtor will be foreclosed from filing for bankruptcy
protection in many instances. Meanwhile, a debtor who was simply
irresponsible with his credit cards but has a substantial income and no
job trouble may be able to seek bankruptcy protection.' 52
This result is both tragic and anomalous, and seems
diametrically opposed to Congress' professed intent in passing
"' In re Lanning, 545 F. 3 d at 1273, 1276 ("Most courts applying this approach view Form
B22C as presumptively correct regarding income').
"So See In re Lanning,545 F.3d at 1281.

151 Id.
152 Id.
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BAPCPA. The Judiciary Committee stated that reasons for passing
BAPCPA include "restoring personal responsibility" to bankruptcy and
ensuring that the system was fair to debtors.'53 The above scenarios, the
results of which are commanded by the mechanical approach, run
contrary to both these goals. The irresponsible debtor in the latter
scenario is rewarded by the mechanical approach, while the responsible
but unfortunate debtor, whom the system is designed to assist, is left
with no protection from creditors.

C. Economic Implications of Bankruptcy
Without making any judgments on BAPCPA as a whole, this
article takes the position that the forward-looking approach comports
with the economic realities of bankruptcy to a greater degree than the
mechanical approach and therefore is the better approach for American
consumers. The forward-looking approach is the better approach
because it provides bankruptcy relief for those who need it, whereas the
mechanical approach denies bankruptcy protection to those who need it
most while providing relief for irresponsible debtors who abuse the
system.154
The number of consumer bankruptcy filings in America has
dramatically risen since 1980.155 Roughly 287,000 consumers filed for
bankruptcy in 1980."6 In 2004, more than 1.5 million consumers filed
for bankruptcy.'57 As a percentage of all households, the number of
filings in the 90's was eight times greater than during the great
depression. 158 Research by the Federal Reserve indicates that consumer
debt is at an all time high relative to household income.159 With the job
market and asset prices tumbling, that figure is certain to go higher.
The growth in consumer bankruptcies during the 80's and 90's
puzzled economists because it was generally a time of economic
prosperity with low unemployment. 6 ° In fact, researchers have
discovered that consumer filings increase more in times of economic

'
114

H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. i, at 2.
In re Lanning, 545 F. 3 d at 1281.
Price, supra note 4, at 140.

'
156 Id.
17 Id. at 141.

l"8 Remarks of Rep. George Gekas, 144 Cong. Rec. E87 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1998) reprinted in
William H. Manz, Bankruptcy Reform, The legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and ConsumerProtectionAct of 2005, vol. i, document i i.
' See Am. Bankr. Inst., Bankruptcy Filing Statistics, www.abiworld.org/statistics (scroll
down to "Consumer debt is consistent with bankruptcy filings,", click on image) (last visited Jan. 7,
2009).

160 Price, supra note 4, at 144.
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prosperity than during recessions.' 6 ' If unemployment was low and the
economy was healthy, why were bankruptcy filings consistently
increasing? The seeming contradiction raised the question: Who was
filing?162
The results of such inquiries were shocking. Professors Theresa
Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook each conducted
independent studies of bankruptcy over a twenty-year period.'63 The
average bankruptcy filer fits squarely in the middle class."' Bankrupt
debtors are more likely to have attended college than the average
American.' 65 Ironically, the bankrupt debtor is also less likely to have
finished college than the average American who begins college.'66 In
other words, the bankrupt debtor is more likely than the average
American college student to leave college without finishing. Bankrupt
debtors largely have jobs commensurate with middle-class status.'67
Additionally, in 2001, more than 50% of bankrupt debtors owned
homes.'68
Despite the middle class standing of most consumer debtors,
most bankruptcy filers have incomes well below median. 6 9 While this
says nothing about the whether the debtors used credit wisely, it does
suggest that many, if not most, consumer debtors experience some
financial disruption that drives their income down and motivates them
to file for bankruptcy. 7 ° Indeed, Professors Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook found evidence that more than two thirds of consumer
debtors suffer some type of employment disruption before filing.'
Other reasons for financial disruption include medical bills, divorce,
7 2
having to care for an elderly relative, or collapse of a small business.
It is important to keep in mind that the huge rise in bankruptcy
161 Sen. Hrg. 105-89 at 39. Increase in Personal Bankruptcy and the Crisis in Consumer
Credit, hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the
Senate Judiciary Committee (April ii, 1997) reprinted in William H. Manz, Bankruptcy Reform:
The Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer ProtectionAct of 2005,
vol. 18, document 233.
16- Price, supra note 4, at 144, citing Elizabeth Warren, FinancialCollapse and Class Status:
Who Goes Bankrupt?,41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1I5, 116 (2003).
163 Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Twenty-First Century
Bankruptcy: Two Decades About Consumer Debt and the Stigma of Bankruptcy 6 (October ig,
2005) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author); see also Price, supra note 4, at 145 (for a

discussion of the Sullivan et al. article).
'6
Price, supra note 4 at 146.
161 Id. at 145, citing Warren, supra note 162, at 116.
166 Id. at 148.
167 Warren, supra note 162, at 136.
16
Price, supra note 4, at 146.
169 Id. at 144.
17o Id. at 144-45.
7
Warren, supra note 162, at 144-46; see also Price, supra note 4, at 147 (for a discussion of
these findings).
171 Price, supra note 4, at 162-64 ("more than half of all consumer bankruptcy filings in igg
involved some type of medical-related problem").
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filings occurred during a time of relatively stable employment. This
belies the notion that employment shocks have been the paramount
cause of bankruptcy filings. Without passing judgment on why
consumers have accumulated so much debt, it seems more likely that
skyrocketing use of consumer credit is driving the rise in bankruptcy.
Consumer debt has risen consistently since 1980, to current all time
highs.' Opponents of BAPCPA state that "the overwhelming weight
of authority establishes that it is the massive increase in consumer
1 74
debt.. .which has brought about the increase in consumer filings. ,
For instance, between 1989 and 2001, credit card debt more than
75
tripled along side a similar increase in consumer bankruptcy filings.,
Once the highly-leveraged consumer experiences an income disruption,
he becomes unable to service his debt and seeks refuge in bankruptcy.
In testimony on the issue of consumer bankruptcy, the Office of the
Comptroller told Congress that it was not surprising that non-business
bankruptcies increase during periods of economic expansion."6 This is
because use of consumer credit actually increases during times of
economic prosperity, and consumer bankruptcy is inextricably linked to
77
consumer credit.
As demonstrated above, the mechanical approach does not
comport with these economic realities. A consumer such as the debtor
in Lanning is unable to obtain bankruptcy protection, despite the facts
that she is in financially dire straights and has proffered a plan to pay
her unsecured creditors.7 8 As indicated by the Sullivan, Warren and
Westbrook study, 179 most bankrupt debtors suffer job loss, or some
other type of employment disruption, shortly before filing. The typical
debtor's B22C income then does not reflect his true ability to pay.
Therefore, he will never be able to propose a feasible plan under
Chapter 13 and is barred from Chapter 7.180 This is regardless of the
fact that he may have been responsible with his credit. But a totally
irresponsible debtor with a substantial income is able to obtain
bankruptcy protection under the mechanical approach. 8 ' This is
backwards and contrary to legislative intent. It is not reasonable to
Ill

See Am.Bankr. Inst., supra note i.

7 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. i,at 576.
'T H.R. REP. No. 109-31, Pt. i, at 49.
176 S. Hrg. 105-89 at 39. Increase in Personal Bankruptcy and the Crisis in Consumer

Credit, hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the
Senate Judiciary Committee (April ii, 1997). Reprinted in William H. Manz, Bankruptcy Reform:
The Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer ProtectionAct of 2005,
vol. i8,document 233.
177 Id.
171
171
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In re Lanning, 545 F. 3 d at 1281.
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assume that Congress secretly intended nonsensical results when they
have stated their intent behind bankruptcy reform was to force debtors
to pay their creditors as much as they are able.
Conversely, under the forward-looking approach, both debtors
would be afforded bankruptcy relief and each debtor would pay their
unsecured creditors according to their ability. Allowing Chapter 13
debtors to repay unsecured creditors to the extent they are able benefits
all consumers.'82

VIII. CONCLUSION
The text of the statute is obviously not "plain" as is evidenced
by the fact that nearly every court on both sides of the argument has
quoted the maxim in their argument. In light of that fact, semantic
arguments seem unnecessary when Congressional intent is so explicit.
Congress stated that BAPCPA "is intended to ensure that debtors repay
creditors the maximum they can afford. 1' 8 3 As the court in In re Kibbe
put it, "Congress intended that debtors pay the greatest amount within
their capabilities. Nothing more; nothing less."' 84 The arguments based
on the text of the statute, which is somewhat ambiguous as to either
argument, should take direction from the completely unambiguous
Congressional intent. The forward-looking method goes much further
than the mechanical approach in ensuring that debtors pay the
maximum they can afford. Thus, Congressional intent supports the
forward-looking approach.
To the extent the statutory language supports one reading over
another, it supports the forward-looking approach. The mechanical
approach requires a totally unnatural reading of the term projected,
while ignoring substantial other portions of the statute as well as
Schedules I and J. Also, the mechanical approach ignores the fact that
Congress chose not to address the term "projected" in projected
disposable income and its traditional role of allowing courts to make
adjustments to disposable income when necessary. Moreover, the
forward-looking approach does not render the §1325(b)(2) definition of
"disposable income" surplusage. To the contrary, disposable income
under the forward-looking approach is the basis for projected
disposable income. Thus, the language of the statute supports the
forward-looking approach.
Courts and commentators have suggested that there is
I

H.R. REP. NO. 109-3 , pt. i,at 2.
8. Id.
184 In re Kibbe, 361 B.R. 302, 314 (B.A.P ist Cir. 2007).
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insufficient legislative history to clearly determine a legislative intent as
to the rewording of § 1325 of the Code. 5 This is objectively false. It
ignores the precursor bills and years of legislative attempts that
culminated in BAPCPA. As one opponent of BAPCPA put it, "[t]he
reported bill is virtually identical to the conference report on H.R. 333
in the 107 th Congress. .. 186 Congressional intent was to force debtors to
pay creditors to the maximum of their ability. Commenting the 2000
version of the law, Bill Clinton wrote that its "central premise" was that
"the debtors who truly have the capacity to repay a portion of their
debts do so."17 Discussing the 1998 version of the Bill, Representative
George Gekas (Pennsylvania) stated "The consumer bankruptcy
provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 are designed to
address a flaw in the bankruptcy law that allows individuals to file for
bankruptcy and walk away from their debts, regardless of whether they
are able to repay a portion of what they owe."' 8 The forward-looking
approach supports this intent. The mechanical approach does not.
Additionally, the forward-looking approach is more consistent
with the economic realities of bankruptcy. The bankrupt debtor
typically suffers some sort of financially disruptive event shortly before
filing and uses -an ever-increasing amount of credit. By relying on
historical income figures, the mechanical approach is inconsistent with
the pattern of income disruption prior to filing. Conversely, the
forward-looking approach accounts for both expanding use of
unsecured credit and the reality of income disruptions by ensuring that
debtors pay what they can.
Finally, common sense favors the forward-looking approach.159
The mechanical approach leads to some debtors paying less than they
are able despite clearly articulated Congressional intent to the contrary.
Further, it denies Chapter 13 protection to those who need it most.
Such results are especially unfortunate as they are not required by the
statute. It is not reasonable to interpret the statute in a way that leads
to nonsensical, counterproductive results when an interpretation that is
at least as viable is available. Such a reading suggests that Congress
intended nonsense when enacting the statue. That is not a reasonable
"'8 In re Lanning, 545 F.3d at 1280. See also Jeffrey R. Drobish, The Forbidden Crystal Ball:
Interpreting "Projected Disposable Income"for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Plans After BAPCPA, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 185, 205 (2007).
186 H.R. REP. NO. 109-3i, pt. 1, at 541.

See also William H. Manz's 18-volume Bankruptcy
Reform: The Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 for an extensive legislative history of BAPCPA.
187 William J. Clinton, Memorandum of Disapprovalon the "Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000,
36 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 3130 (December 19, 20oo). Reprinted in
William H. Manz, Bankruptcy Reform, The legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse and
Consumer ProtectionAct of 2oo5, Vol. i, Document 7.
'~'
See Remarks of Rep. George Gekas, supra note 158.
1 In re Lanning,545 F. 3 d at 1273.
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supposition. Congress intended debtors to pay as much as they are able.
The forward-looking approach supports this intent.

